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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I . NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an administrative driver's license suspension case. 
Raymond Scott Peck (herein "Peck" or "Appellant") appeals from 
the decision of the Idaho Department of Transportation in the 
Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law and Order entered January 
8, 2010 suspending Peck's driver's license and from the decisions 
of the District Court in the Decision On Appeal, entered 
September 28, 2010, and in the Order On Petition For Rehearing, 
entered on December 28, 2010, upholding the suspension of Peck's 
driver's license. 
II. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On or about January 8, 2010, the Idaho Transportation 
Department entered its Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law 
And Order sustaining a Notice of Suspension served upon Peck 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8002A by a City of Sandpoint Police 
Officer on December 2, 2009. R. Pgs. 8-20. Peck filed his 
Petition For Judicial Review And Ex Parte Application For Stay Of 
Agency Decision on January 14, 2010 with the District Court. R. 
Pgs. 4-20. 
Following briefing and oral argument, the District Court 
issued its Decision On Appeal on September 28, 2010 upholding the 
suspension. R. Pgs. 63-76. Following a petition for rehearing, 
etc. and a response and oral argument, the District Court issued 
its Order On Petition For Rehearing on December 28, 2010, 
upholding the suspension. R. Pgs. 87-95. This appeal follows. 
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III. CONCISE STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appellant Raymond Scott Peck is a resident of Bonner 
County, Idaho. On December 2, 2009, Peck turned left from the 
business known as the Wily Widgeon driveway onto Highway 200. 
Peck traveled on Highway 200 to the intersection with US 95, and 
continued traveling southbound on US 95. The distance Peck 
traveled exceeded 600 feet in length. Sandpoint Police Officer 
Nolan Crossley initiated a traffic stop upon Peck for traveling 45 
miles per hour prior to the North Information Center on US 95. 
There are no structures along the highway for the entire distance 
traveled by Peck prior to the stop being initiated. December 29, 
2009 Transcript, Pgs. 3-5. 
During the traffic stop, Peck did not complete any field 
sobriety tests. At the station, while in custody, following the 
first 15 minute observation period, Peck submitted to the breath 
test, with an invalid result. A second 15 minute observation 
period was commenced, during which time Peck opened his mouth and 
belched, and also patted or tapped on his chest with his fist, all 
in the presence of the officer. No additional or new 15 minute 
observation period was commenced. Less than one minute elapsed 
between the time of the belch and the breath testing conducted. 
The breach test results were .083/.086. December 29, 2009 
Transcript, Pgs. 5-7. 
Peck was cited by SPD Citation No. 41744 with a violation of 
"Excess of Max Speed Limit 49-654(2) 45 mph in posted 35 mph 
zone," which is the basis for the stop resulting in the request 
for blood alcohol content (BAC) testing. 
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ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant Peck's statement of the issues on appeal is as 
follows: 
(a) Was the hearing properly noticed and held pursuant to 
statute? 
(b) Was the Petitioner fully informed of the consequences 
of testing so as to conform to due process? 
(c) Is the Affidavit so lacking as to be not credible? 
(d) Did probable cause grounds exist for the stop? 
(e) Were the BAC test results obtained in conformance with 
the testing procedures? 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
The Appellant Peck seeks to keep alive the possibility of an 
award attorney fees on appeal against the Respondent State of 
Idaho, Department Of Transportation pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-
117, if then applicable. 
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ARGUMENT ON APPEAL 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR THE SUSPENSION OF A PERSON'S 
DRIVER'S LICENSE 
The standard of review for a decision by the State of Idaho, 
Department of Transportation to suspend a person's driver's 
license was recently reiterated by the Idaho Court of Appeals in 
Bennett v. State, Dept. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 142-43,206 
P.3d 50S, 506-07 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009), as follows: 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (I.D.A.P.A.) 
governs the review of department decisions to deny, cancel, 
suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's 
license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. In 
an appeal from the decision of the district court acting in 
its appellate capacity under I.D.A.P.A., this Court reviews 
the agency record independently of the district court's 
decision. Marsha~~ v. Idaho Dep't or Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 
340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct.App.2002). This Court does not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the 
weight of the evidence presented. I.C. § 67-5279(1); 
Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court 
instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they 
are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton Cor.p., 130 
Idaho 923, 926, 950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marsha~~, 137 
Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's 
factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, 
even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, 
so long as the determinations are supported by substantial 
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. B~aine County, 
ex re~. Bd. or Comm'rs, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 
(2000); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its 
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful 
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). The party challenging the 
agency decision must demonstrate that the agency erred in a 
manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial 
*143 **507 right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. 
Payette County Bd. or County Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426, 429, 
958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marsha~~, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on 
appeal, "it shall be set aside ... and remanded for further 
proceedings as necessary." I.C. § 67-5279(3). 
The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, 
I.C. § 18-8002A, requires that the lTD suspend the driver's 
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license of a driver who has failed a BAC test administered 
by a law enforcement officer. The period of suspension is 
ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evidentiary 
test and one year for any subsequent test failure within 
five years. I.C. § lS-S002A(4) (a). A person who has been 
notified of an ALS may request a hearing before a hearing 
officer designated by the lTD to contest the suspension. 
I.C. § lS-S002A(7). At the administrative hearing, the 
burden of proof rests upon the driver to prove any of the 
grounds to vacate the suspension. I.C. § lS-S002A(7); Kane 
v. State, Dep't ox Transp., 139 Idaho 5S6, 590, S3 P.3d 130, 
134 (Ct.App.2003). The hearing officer must uphold the 
suspension unless he or she finds, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, that the driver has shown one of several grounds 
enumerated in I.C. § lS-S002A(7) for vacating the 
suspension. Those grounds include: 
(a) The peace officer did not have legal cause to stop 
the person; or 
(b) The officer did not have legal cause to believe the 
person had been driving or was in actual physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, drugs or other intoxicating substances in 
violation of the provisions of section lS-S004, lS-
S004C or lS-S006, Idaho Code; or 
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol 
concentration or the presence of drugs or other 
intoxicating substances in violation of section lS-
S004, lS-8004C or lS-S006, Idaho Code; or 
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other 
intoxicating substances administered at the direction 
of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance 
with the requirements of section lS-S004(4) , Idaho 
Code, or the testing equipment was not functioning 
properly when the test was administered; or 
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of 
submitting to evidentiary testing as required in 
subsection (2) of this section. 
I.C. § lS-S002A(7). The hearing officer's decision is 
subject to challenge through a petition for judicial review. 
I.C. § lS-S002A(S); Kane, 139 Idaho at 5S9, S3 P.3d at 133. 
II. THE LICENSE SUSPENSION HEARING WAS NOT HELD PURSUANT TO THE 
REQUIRED STATUTORY NOTICE 
Idaho Code § lS-S002A(7) Administrative hearing on 
suspension, provides in relevant part as follows: 
A person who has been served with a notice of 
suspension after submitting to an evidentiary test may 
request an administrative hearing on the suspension before a 
hearing officer designated by the department. The request 
for hearing shall be in writing and must be received by the 
department within seven (7) calendar days of the date of 
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service upon the person of the notice of suspension, and 
shall include what issue or issues shall be raised at the 
hearing. The date on which the hearing request was received 
shall be noted on the face of the request. 
If a hearing is requested, the hearing shall be held 
within twenty (20) days of the date the hearing request was 
received by the department unless this period is, for good 
cause shown, extended by the hearing officer for one ten 
(10) day period. Such extension shall not operate as a stay 
of the suspension, notwithstanding an extension of the 
hearing date beyond such thirty (30) day period. Written 
notice of the date and time of the hearing shall be sent to 
the party requesting the hearing at least seven (7) days 
prior to the scheduled hearing date. The department may 
conduct all hearings by telephone if each participant in the 
hearing has an opportunity to participate in the entire 
proceeding while it is taking place. 
*** 
Peck's request for hearing was timely made on December 8, 
2009 (Agency R., pgs 13-14). The State of Idaho, Department of 
Transportation (herein "lTD") issued several notices thereafter. 
On December 15, 2009, the lTD first issued by u.S. Mail its Notice 
Of Telephonic Hearing (Agency R., pg 20) setting December 29, 2009 
as the hearing date with hearing officer Mark Richmond, and then 
issued by u.S. Mail its Show Cause Letter (Agency R., pg 21) 
citing a conflict with hearing officer Mark Richmond's schedule to 
justify an extension beyond the required 20 day statutory deadline 
request, within a single 10 day statutory extension. 
On December 18, 2009, the lTD first issued by fax at 2:19 
p.m. its Notice of Telephonic Hearing (Agency R., pgs 22-23) 
changing the date to December 9, 2009 and changing the hearing 
officer to Eric Moody, and then issued by fax at 3:40 p.m. its 
Show Cause Letter (Agency R., pgs 24-25) citing a change of the 
designated hearing officer. 
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The telephonic hearing was conducted on December 29, 2009 by 
the State of Idaho, Department Of Transportation with Hearing 
Officer Eric Moody, not on the date of December 9, 2009 that was 
scheduled for the hearing and beyond the 20 day statutory deadline 
for holding such hearing. The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and 
Show Cause Letter, each dated December 15, 2009 (Agency R., pgs 
20-21) provided for hearing officer Mark Richmond and a hearing 
date of December 29, 2009. The Notice of Telephonic Hearing and 
Show Cause Letter, each dated December lS, 2009 (Agency R., pgs 
22-25) provided for the hearing to be December 9, 2009 before 
hearing officer Eric Moody. The hearing was not conducted 
pursuant to the noticed date of December 9, 2009, nor was the 
hearing held in compliance with the statutory time limits of Idaho 
Code lS-S002A. 
The December lS, 2009 Notices changed both the hearing 
officer and the hearing date. In addition, once the hearing 
officer was changed to Eric Moody, there was not a show cause 
letter or assertion to exceed the 20 day hearing deadline in Idaho 
Code lS-S002A(7). The basis for the December 29 hearing date was 
that the hearing officer Mark Richmond had a scheduling conflict. 
There is nothing in the record to support holding the hearing on 
December 29 and there is nothing in the record to exceed the 20 
day period for hearing officer Eric Moody. The hearing was held 
on a then unnoticed date of December 29, 2009. The hearing was 
not noticed nor held in compliance with the statutory provisions 
of Idaho Code lS-S002A. Thus, the decision upholding the license 
suspension should be vacated as the agency's decision (a) 
violated statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
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agency's statutory authority; and/or (c) was made upon unlawful 
procedure. 
III. THE NECESSARY ADVICE OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE BREATH 
TESTING WAS LACKING, RESULTING IN NO IMPLIED CONSENT AND A 
VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS 
Idaho Code § 49-335(2) provides that "[a]ny person who 
operates a commercial motor vehicle or who holds a class A, B or C 
driver's license is disqualified from operating a commercial 
vehicle for a period of not less that one (1) year if the person 
refuses to submit to or submits to and fails a test to determine 
the driver's alcohol, drug or other intoxicating substances 
concentration while operating a motor vehicle." The Notice of 
Suspension form served upon Peck (Agency R., pgs 1-2) fails to 
satisfy the notice requirements of Idaho Code and of due process, 
as it fails to give notice of the provisions and consequences of 
Idaho Code § 49-335(2). As in the circumstances of Wanner v. 
State, Dept. of Transp., 150 Idaho 164,244 P.3d 1250, 1252 
(2011), the Notice does " ... not address the situation presented 
by the underlying facts of this case: the consequences of 
refusing or failing evidentiary testing for the holder of a CDL 
who was not operating a commercial vehicle at the time of contact 
with law enforcement. This is significant because I.C. § 49-
335(2) provides that a motorist who fails evidentiary testing is 
disqualified from operating a commercial vehicle for not less 
than one year." 
The Idaho statutes for alcohol testing in Idaho Code §§ 18-
8002 and 18-8002A are based upon implied consent. The statutory 
fiction of implied consent is conditioned upon notice of the 
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consequences being given to the driver immediately prior to the 
testing. Without proper notice, the driver has not given implied 
consent and the license cannot be suspended. 
Evidentiary testing for blood alcohol is a seizure of the 
person and a search for evidence. Pursuant to the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution, Peck has a 
substantial right to be free of search or seizure. See State v. 
Cooper, 39 P.3d 637, 136 Idaho 697 (2001). In order to have a 
search and seizure, a driver'S informed or implied consent must be 
based upon an accurate advice of the consequences. Here there is 
no advice given prior to the request for testing that a person's 
CDL privileges are impacted differently than the other driving 
privileges in the advisory (one year as opposed to 90 days). As 
such there is not sufficient advice. The legal rational and 
analysis is the same as if the consequences of the "standard" 
advisory form were not read to the driver at all. The outcome is 
the same on the advisory form's advice whether given or not: take 
the test and fail OR refuse the test and the driver faces the same 
suspension result. There is no basis to uphold a suspension if 
the results of the decision are the same. The case law is exactly 
the opposite. The law requires the advice to be given to the 
driver to "validate" the implied or informed consent. 
As explained in Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 
P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995), "Idaho law requires strict 
adherence to the statutory language ... " which provides notice. 
Further, a driver's license is to be reinstated if the driver is 
"not completely advised of his rights and duties." Matter of 
Virgil, 126 Idaho 946, 947, 895 P.2d 182, 183 (Idaho App. 1995) 
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citing Matter of Griffiths, 113 Idaho 364, 370, 744 P.2d 92, 98 
(1987). Also, as set forth in Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 
833-834, 41 P.3d 257, 261 - 262 (Idaho 2002) the warrantless 
search exception is based upon the implied consent. Implied 
consent requires notice of one's rights and the consequences. As 
no notice is given of the disqualification provisions of Idaho 
Code § 49-335(2), there is no implied and no informed consent. 
Thus without being informed of the statutory provision, the 
testing is not upon consent, and violates due process. The 
hearing officer's decision should be vacated as it (a) violates 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceeds the agency's 
statutory authority; (c) is made upon unlawful procedure; (d) is 
not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) is 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 
IV. THE AFFIDAVIT AND TEST RESULTS ARE LACKING TO SUPPORT 
SUSPENSION 
The Affidavit and test results used to sustain the 
suspension (Agency R., pgs 3-8) are defective in that the 
documents fail to identify the alleged acts as occurring in the 
State of Idaho, indicate Sim. Check No. 0008 and 0009 having 
variations of .005, and show the officer's statements in the 
narrative directly contrary to the officer's statements in the 
check the box portions of affidavit. The affidavit fails to 
identify the State of Idaho as the location of the contact. This 
same affidavit asserts in the narrative that certain tests were 
not administered, but in the check the box portion asserts the 
tests were given and failed. 
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Taken as a whole, the credibility of the affidavit and test 
results are lacking on their face. This argument is not that 
there are technical defects or lacking defects in the 
Department's documentation, but rather credibility is lacking to 
support the alleged facts and/or suspension. Thus the decision 
should be vacated as it (d) is not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record; or (e) is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion. 
V. THERE WAS NO PROBABLE CAUSE GROUNDS FOR THE STOP 
The Affidavit used to sustain the suspension (Agency R., pgs 
5-8) and the traffic citation No. 41744 asserts the basis for the 
stop as traveling 45 mph in a posted 35 mph zone, with visual 
estimation and radar indicating 45 mph, in violation of Idaho 
Code § 49-654(2). 
Idaho Code § 49-654(2) contains two provisions for 35 mile 
per hour speed zones, specifically in subparagraphs (a) and (b), 
as follows: 
(a) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour or a lesser maximum 
speed adopted pursuant to section 49-207(2) (a), Idaho 
Code, in any residential, business, or urban district. 
(b) Thirty-five (35) miles per hour in any urban district. 
Idaho Code § 49-105(11) provides the definition for district 
as follows: "District" means: 
(a) Business district. The territory contiguous to and 
including a highway when within any six hundred (600) 
feet along the highway there are buildings in use for 
business or industrial purposes, including hotels, 
banks or office buildings, railroad stations and public 
buildings which occupy at least three hundred (300) 
feet of frontage on one side or three hundred (300) 
feet collectively on both sides of the highway. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF - 11 
(b) Residential district. The territory contiguous to and 
including a highway not comprising a business district 
when the property on the highway for a distance of 
three hundred (300) feet or more is in the main 
improved with residences, or residences and buildings 
in use for business. 
(c) Urban district. The territory contiguous to and 
including any highway which is built up with structures 
devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses. For 
purposes of establishing speed limits in accordance 
with the provisions of section 49-654, Idaho Code, no 
state highway or any portion thereof lying within the 
boundaries of an urban district is subject to the 
limitations which otherwise apply to nonstate highways 
within an urban district. Provided, this subsection 
shall not limit the authority of the duly elected 
officials of an incorporated city acting as a local 
authority to decrease speed limits on state highways 
passing through any district within the incorporated 
city. 
There is no testimony or evidence in the record by the 
Officer other than the general assertion of a posted speed limit 
of 35 mph. There is no factual statement of any specific sign or 
any specific posting of a speed limit. There is no testimony or 
evidence in the record by the Officer or otherwise, as to the 
speed zone, and the uncontroverted testimony of Peck is that 
there were no buildings or structures occupying the sides of the 
highway necessary to meet the statutory definition of business 
district, residential district, or urban district. There were no 
structures or buildings in use for business or industrial 
purposes, including hotels, banks or office buildings, railroad 
stations and public buildings (Business District). There were no 
structures or buildings in the main improved with residences, or 
residences and buildings in use for business (Residential 
District). There were no structures or buildings built up with 
structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling houses 
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(Urban District). Therefore, the speed limit on Highway 200 and 
US 95 in the location of the contact is controlled by Idaho Code 
§ 49-654(2) (d) providing for a limit of 65 miles per hour. 
When presented with the uncontroverted facts and argument, 
the hearing examiner concluded in the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Order entered the 8th day of January, 2010 
Agency Record, pages 49-50, that " ... it is assumed this area of 
highway met the requirements of Idaho Code §49-654(2) (a) and/or 
(b) even though there are no structures or buildings in the area 
prior to Peck being stopped." The hearing examiner cannot 
"assume" matters not in the record, and which are contrary to the 
statutory basis for the stop, and/or which are controverted by 
specific uncontested testimony of the Petitioner. See Bennett v. 
lTD, 147 Idaho 141 (Id.Ct.App. 2009), discussed in further detail 
below. 
Peck's argument can be summarized as follows: The statutorily 
defined District sets the applicable speed limit. A speed limit 
sign posted contrary to the statute is of no effect. The posting 
is void and ultra vires. In other words, the sign does not 
control the speed limit; rather the statutory definitions and 
provisions define the speed limit. A sign posted contrary to the 
law, is of no effect. As described in Dabestani v. Bellus, 131 
Idaho 542, 549, 961 P.2d 633, 638-640 (1998), a posted speed 
limit sign not in conformance with the actual speed limit is of 
no force and effect. 
It cannot be presumed or even assumed that a posted speed 
limit sign controls what statutory District exists. If this were 
the case, the statutes would simply provide for all speed limits 
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to be set by posting, not by District definition. The posting 
must comply with the District, as defined by statute, to be valid 
and enforceable. 
The lTD has argued that a city can lower the 45 mile per hour 
speed within the Urban District pursuant to Idaho Code 49-
105(11(c). In order for this provision to be applicable, Peck 
would have had to have been in an Urban District (and proof of a 
city acting would be necessary). As irrefutably established by 
the evidence, the portion of the highway upon which Peck was 
traveling, was NOT in an Urban District. Therefore, it is 
irrelevant if an incorporated city acted or not, because an 
incorporated city only has authority to act in the Urban District, 
not outside of an Urban District. 
The lTD and its hearing officer cannot "assume" matters not 
in the record and contrary to the statutory scheme establishing 
speed limits. Thus, the hearing officer's finding that probable 
cause grounds existed for the stop is not supported by 
substantial evidence in the record as a whole and the decision 
should be vacated. 
VI. THE HAC TESTS ARE INVALID AS THE TESTING DID NOT MEET THE 
APPLICABLE PROCEDURES 
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police 
("ISP") are charged with promulgating standards for administering 
tests for breath alcohol content and the ISP has issued operating 
manuals establishing procedures for the maintenance and operation 
of breath test equipment. Pursuant to In Re Mahurin, 140 Idaho 
656, 659, (Idaho App. 2004), noncompliance with the maintenance 
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and operation procedures is a ground for vacating an 
administrative license suspension under I.C. § 18-8002A(7) (d). 
As set forth in State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 453 (Idaho App. 
1999) and Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of Transportation, 147 Idaho 
141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009), the pertinent portion of the 
manual instructs: 
Observe the subject for 15 minutes. During this time, the 
subject may not smoke, consume alcohol, belch, vomit, use 
chewing tobacco, or have any other substance in the mouth. 
If belching or vomiting does occur or something is found in 
the mouth, wait an additional 15 minutes. 
Peck testified that he belched during the monitoring period, 
less than a minute before taking the breath test. The fact of 
the audible belch and physical actions accompanying the audible 
belch are not controverted. The monitoring period is required in 
order to rule out the possibility that alcohol or other 
substances have been introduced into the subject's mouth from the 
outside or by belching or regurgitation. Carson, 133 Idaho at 
453. Only the officer's probable cause affidavit was submitted 
to the record in support of the suspension. The officer's form 
affidavit provides only generalized statements regarding 
employment of proper procedures. Peck presented uncontroverted 
specific facts of the belch. 
Peck met his burden to prove grounds to vacate the 
suspension of his license, as he testified to the belch. The 
hearing officer did not find Peck's testimony to lack credibility 
and in fact had no basis upon which to find. When presented with 
the uncontroverted specific facts and argument, the hearing 
examiner concluded in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order entered the 8~ day of January, 2010 (R. page 51) that 
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the test was performed in compliance with the standards. Peck's 
testimony demonstrates that proper monitoring procedures were not 
followed, and that the test for alcohol concentration was, 
therefore, not conducted in accordance with the requirements of 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). The officer's general, non-specific affidavit 
is insufficient to support a finding when compared to the 
credible evidence of Peck that demonstrates a violation of proper 
procedures. See generally Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of 
Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009). Thus, 
the hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted 
in compliance with procedural standards is directly contrary to 
the Bennett holding. 
There is no means by which to distinguish the Bennett case 
and holding from this matter. In Bennett v. Idaho Dept. of 
Transportation, 147 Idaho 141, 144-145 (Idaho App. 2009), the 
officer's affidavit asserted general compliance with the testing 
procedures (which would include that he was present to observe 
during the observation period). In this circumstance the 
officer's affidavit likewise asserts general compliance with the 
testing procedures (which would include that he did not observe 
any belch). In Bennett, the specific testimony was that the 
officer did not observe during the entire observation period. In 
this circumstance, the specific testimony by Peck is that the 
officer did observe a belch during the observation period. The 
facts and the holding of Bennett fall squarely in line with the 
pending issue. The hearing officer did not have any credible 
specific evidence from the officer's general affidavit that Peck 
did not belch to refute the specific testimony of Peck. 
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Peck's testimony demonstrates that proper monitoring 
procedures were not followed, and that the test for alcohol 
concentration was, therefore, not conducted in accordance with 
the requirements of I.C. § 18-8004(4). There was no specific 
conflicting evidence presented by the hearing officer. Thus, the 
hearing officer's finding that the breath test was conducted in 
compliance with procedural standards is directly contrary to the 
Bennett holding, and is not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole. The decision should therefore be vacated. 
VII. IS IDAHO CODE § 12-117 AGAIN APPLICABLE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Notwithstanding the most recent rounds of appellate Court 
interpretation and legislative amendments to Idaho Code § 12-117, 
Peck seeks to maintain the possibility to recover attorney fees 
against the State of Idaho, Department of Transportation, pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 12-117, which governs the award of attorney fees 
in proceedings between persons and state agencies. 
When applicable to a proceeding, Idaho Code § 12-117 is not a 
discretionary statute. It provides that the court sha~~ award 
attorney fees upon a finding that the state agency did not act 
with a reasonable basis in fact or law. Idaho Dept. of Law 
Enforcement v. Kluss, 125 Idaho 682, 685 (1994). The policy 
behind I.C. § 12-117 is: "1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless 
or arbitrary agency action; and 2) to provide a remedy for persons 
who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending 
against groundless charges or attempting to correct mistakes 
agencies never should ha[ve] made." Id., (quoting Bogner v. State 
Dep't of Revenue & Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859 (1984». 
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Here, the Department's hearing officer's decision has no 
basis in law or fact to uphold the Peck's suspension. The hearing 
officer cannot ignore credible, specific, and uncontroverted 
evidence or make conclusions directly contrary to law. The 
conduct invokes both purposes of the statutory policy, and 
attorney fees should be awarded to the Peck to discourage such 
conduct and to allow recovery for the unjustified financial burden 
placed on the Peck by the hearing officer's erroneous decision. 
CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, for any of the several grounds asserted, 
the decision of the Hearing Examiner sustaining the Notice of 
Suspension should be vacated, as well as the District Court's 
decisions sustaining the suspension. The relief sought is to 
reverse the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Order by 
denying and/or vacating the suspension of the Peck's driving 
privileges, to reinstate the driving privileges, and if 
applicable, for an award to Peck of attorney fees and costs 
against the Respondent. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this { day of July, 2011. 
FINNEY, P.A. 
Attorney for Appellant PECK 
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